Introduction
Much of the controversy surrounding the use of un certainty calculi in AI can be explained by a differ ence in the emphasis the competing approaches place on the various tasks faced by the problem-solver. In this essay, we argue that comparisons of competing uncertainty mechanisms in the context of any sin gle task do not clarify the debate and further, that the attempt to completely describe the aspects of uncertainty necessary to support all of these tasks within a single "calculus" is misguided. Instead, we believe that the important advances in technology for building computer programs that reason under uncertainty will be achieved via knowledge represen;.. tations that serve computational requirements nor mally considered beyond the realm of belief combi nation and decision making formalisms. Computing facilities were provided by the SUMEX-AIM re source under NIH grant RR 00785. 1 It is difficult to separate precisely the uncertainty "cal culi" from "non-calculus" uncertainty representation mecha nisms. Loosely speaking, we take calculi to be representa tions that directly attach some kind of "measure of belief"
to proposition-like objects and provide a small set of com bination rules for deriving belief measures for aggregations and transformations of the basic objects. Bayesian probabil ities [12] , Dempster-Shaler (D-S) belief functions [41] , MYCIN
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We are driven to this view by the observation that knowledge engineering issues that arise in asse mbling and utilizing a knowledge base built on any uncer tainty mechanism are not practically subject to the normative interpretations of calculus elements that may hold within the knowledge base. Such engineer ing concerns-perhaps not necess arily but always in practice--fall "outside the model." Therefore, argu ments based only on properties of the calculus within the model cannot be conclusive.
These motivations resemble Shafer's well-stated arguments for "constructive probability" (42, 44] . However, where Shafer concludes that constructive issues should guide comparison of calculi, we focus on the implications on representations and mecha nisms supporting uncertain reasoning tasks.
2

Uncertain Reasoning Tasks
For concreteness , our analysis focuses on a mythi cal program for reasoning about medical problems, which we shall call the robot physician. Though we do not propose that technology of the near future will permit us to build a program comparable to humans in all respects, the demands of such a broad domain dictate strong design constraints on mechanisms for uncertain reasoning. We start by putting ourselves in the place of a knowledge engineer embarking on the design of this certainty factors [45] , and fuzzy poss ibility [54] , for example, are well-known uncertainty representations that fall easily into the category of calculi. robot physician. In the sections below, we discuss specific tasks that arise in uncertain reasoning to il lustrate more forcefully the different representational issues that a knowledge engineer would face. We will see that no scheme yet presented is ideal for all of these tasks, and it is unrealistic to expect that any ''framework" describable as an incremental extension to a calculus would be.
2.1
The One-Shot Decision
The basic task is one we call the "one-shot decision," which corresponds to the usual decision-theoretic for mulation of a choice problem.
In the one-shot decision, the physician is required to choose from a set of alternate acts (for example, strategies involving combinations of diagnostic tests and drug therapies). To account for uncertainty, we postulate a state of nature that is unknown to the decision-maker (perhaps the identity and other fea tures of the patient's disease) but is taken to be one of a set of possible states. The outcome of the decision (the resulting health and well-being of the patient) is determined by the actual state of nature and the chosen action.
A Bayesian decision-maker has a utility function over outcomes and a probability distribution over states of nature, and chooses the action that maxi mizes expected utility. In designing a robot physi cian for particular one-shot decisions, we can en sure that it is Bayesian by explicitly encoding its knowledge in the form of these objects-action sets, states of nature sets, utility functions, and proba bility distributions-using notations similar to those developed by decision analysts [29, 37, 40] . Indeed, given desiderata for belief measures and "rational de cision making" [11, 39] , Bayesians can make a strong case for decision models as uniquely valid knowledge representations. Any weaker body of assertions may not justify a choice of action, and any additional in formation must be superfluous with respect to the decision.
Even those accepting the Bayesian arguments re garding the normative status of decision theory are free to reject the use of decision-theoretic models as a knowledge representation on pragmatic knowledge engineering grounds [50] . We consider this position in Section 3.
The pure one-shot decision scenario is an ideal ization that is only defensible in extremely time constrained, highly-specialized situations in which a decision model must be pre-fabricated, perhaps in a hospital emergency room or during a surgical oper-322 ation. More generally, a decision is embedded in a situation calling for additional reasoning capabilities.
Information Gathering
Once we relax the time constraint, our robot physi cian has several options in addition to the primary decision.
Acquire more knowledge or information.
The robot physician may benefit from reading journal articles, exploring patient databases, or finding out more about the patient before making the decision in question. While information-gathering actions that possibly have serious medical consequences invasive tests such as biopsies, for example-are of ten explicitly considered as part of the decision, rela tively inexpensive steps like asking the patient ques tions are usually outside any formal decision model.
Wait for uncertain events to resolve. Sometimes valuable information can be obtained simply by wait ing to see how things turn out. Because the benefits of a "wait" strategy are largely computational (we avoid planning for some contingencies that do not obtain anyway), incorporating this option within the primary decision model is technically difficult.
Ask other physicians for advice. The robot physi cian's colleagues (human or machine) may be bet ter suited for this decision or might complement the robot's own expertise. The communication skills necessary for this strategy form an important class of reasoning tasks in their own right, and are discussed further in Section 2.3.
Design and perform experiments. In treating pa tients, information-gathering is typically limited to direct data acquisition or observing the results of pre established experiments such as cell cultures. How ever, designing experiments (or at least somewhat modifying existing procedures) is always a real op tion to a decision-maker. For a robot research physi cian, experimentation would be a primary activity. To take advantage of this more active form of knowl edge acquisition, the robot needs to understand the relationship between the uncertainty in its decision problem and other uncertainties that it can test in the world.
To perform any of these tasks-and even to se lect which of these avenues to pursue-our robot will need a very rich description of the state and nature of uncertainties involved in its decision envi ronment. The knowledge prerequisites for effective information-gathering go well beyond the require ments for modeling the primary decision itself. As mentioned above, one of the options open to our robot physician is to seek the advice of a human or machine colleague. Let us consider the communi cation tasks faced by two types of physician in this situation: a generalist and a specialist, either or both of which might be machines. For simplicity, we will assume the generalist is the decision maker or has direct access to the decision maker's preferences. In a simple interaction, the generalist might con sult a specialist dedicated to a particular decision problem. The model for the decision, including al ternate acts, relevant events, outcomes, and proba bilities, are as8umed to be explicitly encoded in the knowledge base of this super-specialist. In such a situation, the generalist needs only communicate to the super-specialist the patient-specifi c details of the problem such as the patient's symptoms and � ref erences. The specialist then computes the optimal strategy using the calculus of decision theory and re ports the result to the generalist. If an explanation is desired, the super-specialist could display to the generalist the sensitive portions of the model along with any needed discussion of decision theory.
In a more complex interaction between general ist and specialist, the generalist cannot assume that the specialist has a pre-existing decision model and therefore must present an accurate account of the de cision problem to the expert. The consult-requesting generalist cannot in practice describe all of its in formation relevant to the problem; instead, it must choose appropriate levels of abstraction at which to convey its knowledge. For example, rather than 'pre senting its consultant with a photographic image of the patient's retina, it might simply report that the fundascopic examination was "normal." In this communication task, the generalist must balance the costs of precise communication with the benefits of avoiding misinterpretation.
In reacting to this description, a specialist consul tant must construct a model from the problem de scription and its "background knowledge." In doing so, it may identify or synthesize additional strate gies not considered by the generalist, select state variables relevant to the problem, and characterize probabilistic relationships among the variables and strategies. Model construction issues are discussed further in Section 3.1.
Once the model is constructed, the robot specialist must present and possibly explain the implications of the model to the generalist. In many cases, a sim ple explanation like the one described above may be sufficient. Often, however, the generalist may not ac-323 cept one or more components of the model adopted by the specialist. For example, the specialist's prob abilities for uncertain events in the model may be different from those of the generalist and a discrep ancy may still exist after the generalist hears the specialist state its beliefs. In thi � case, the s � ecial�st is faced with a complex explanatiOn task: to Identify and present pieces of knowledge to the consulting generalist that will convince it of the validity of the specialist's beliefs. We will refer to this complex ex planation task as justification, recognizing that oth ers have used this term to denote broader or some what different explanation activities.
Finding the optimal amount of knowledge and the level of abstraction at which to present it is a highly complex task. If too little or excessively abstract knowledge is conveyed, the physician will not be con vinced. If too much or excessively fine-grained infor mation is given, the physician will find the specialist a waste of time.
Most importantly, the information provided by the specialist should be a function of the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the agent seeking consultation. Knowledge valuable to one agent may be worthless to another.
This facet of justification has received some atten tion by artifi cial intelligence researchers under the name of user-modeling [46] . Knowledge representa tions consisting primarily of an uncertainty calculus (as employed by statistical diagnostic aids [1, 25, 49] ) provide virtually no support for this task. While the volume of representation research in both uncer tainty and epistemology has been great (enough to merit sizable conferences [20, 27] ), their intersection has been slight.
In discussing justifi cation, we have assumed that the specialist's knowledge relevant to the decision problem is a superset of the generalist's knowledge. If this is not the case, the robot specialist or, more appropriately, the robot colleague, faces the task of trying to discover the information held by the consult requester that it does not currently possess. Simi larly, the requester must try to pinpoint this infor mation and present it to its colleague. In such a situation, our robots are faced with the extremely complex task of constructive debate.
2.4
Diversity of Reasoning Tasks:
Discussion
Others have noted that different tasks may call for different uncertainty mechanisms [4] . In enumerating the reasoning tasks above, we emphasized the multiplicity of requirements the various tasks impose on a representation scheme for uncertain knowledge. Be cause of the additional tasks surrounding any central choice problem, the decision model complete for the one-shot decision is no longer adequate. Compet ing knowledge representation mechanisms must be evaluated on their support for these other tasks. As we argue below, performance on these tasks is de termined by structural and computational issues not by selection of an underlying uncertainty calcu lus afone.
Knowledge Engineering Is sues
The enumeration of tasks above demonstrated that the knowledge sufficient to make a one-shot decision does not necessarily support other, equally necessary, reasoning tasks. In this section, we present addi tional grounds for considering extra-calculitic issues even within the one-shot decision scenario. These arguments rule out the formulation of information gathering and communication into a more general decision-making problem as an antidote for our task diversity conclusions. A solution to the problem of building a robot physician must be sensitive to issues concerning the assembly of the robot's knowledge by its human designers. The knowledge representations that are best with respect to decision-making performance and computational efficiency may not be optimal or even feasible when it comes to knowledge engi neering. The sections below provide several rea sons that knowledge encoded in other forms might be preferable, and identify representational issues salient for computerized decision-making from non decision-analytic knowledge bases.
Model Construction
In the discussion of reasoning tasks above (Sec tion 2), we started with a representation oriented to ward a primary decision and showed that this model failed to support the surrounding reasoning tasks.
Here we start with a knowledge base not necessar ily in the form of a decision model and consider the problem of formulating a model for the primary de cision from this representation. A decision model is suitable as a knowledge base only for the most specialized of robot physicians. A model covering more than a very narrow body of de cision contexts is a poor one for any particular med-324 ical problem because the extraneous features con sidered tend to entail an unnecessary information gathering burden and to obscure explanations of the result. General models cannot take advantage of sim plifying features that-while present in any given de cision problem-vary from case to case. In fact, we are aware of no decision-analytic models in medicine applicable outside of a narrowly-defined class of pa tient cases. This limitation is not restricted to deci sion analysis technology, however; AI-style medical expert systems that generate treatment recommen dations have invariably been super-specialists. 2 One approach toward overcoming the apparent un scalability of decision models is to build a knowledge base in some other form and endeavor to customize a decision model for each given problem instance. Un fortunately, we have to be rather vague about these "other forms" of knowledge representation because efforts to build large knowledge bases in AI projects to date have met with only mixed success. Never theless, we cite below several features of AI tech niques which can undoubtedly enhance the extensi bility of existing computational mechanisms for de cision modeling.
Broadly speaking, decision models and therefore the task of constructing them can be partitioned into three components:
• generating possible strategies,
• identifying relevant variables, and
• assignment of beliefs and preferences.
The target representation for a decision-model con structor must have objects corresponding to the strategies, events, probabilities, and utilities pro duced by these component tasks. Note that the decision-model formalisms cited above may be suit able target representations despite their inadequacy for general knowledge representation in the robot.
The potential advantages of alternate knowledge representations lie in the possibility of implicitly cap turing an enormous variety of decision models in a relatively compact encoding. For example, in tradi tional AI planning,3 the set of strategies is implicitly represented by a description of the action types and 
Likewise, the set of possible events to include in the target decision model may be combinatorial in some more primitive type of element, for example if events can be described as patterns of sub-events over time. Or perhaps variations on events are de scribable by combinations of lower-level features. If so, a terminological knowledge representation facility (exemplified by KL-ONE [3] ) would allow the knowl edge engineer to describe structural relations among features, leaving instantiation of precise feature com binations (an exponential number of possibilities) to the requirements of a particular problem instance. In either case, the static decision model form of knowl edge representation fails to take advantage of struc tural regularity because it requires that the most de tailed descriptions of events explicitly appear at the surface of the knowledge base.
Many of these advantages may be achieved at least in part by incremental enhancements to exist ing decision-model computational tools. Regardless of implementation perspective, the knowledge engi neering benefits accrue from the adoption of knowl edge representations separate from the decision mod els produced for the final analysis.
Knowledge Modification
An important concern for the representation of knowledge is the ease with which a representation can be modifi ed. In real-world applications, a knowl edge base that is difficult to modify soon becomes obsolete. The key characteristic of a representation when it comes to modifying the knowledge base is modularity. Modularity is an engineering concern for any knowledge-based system; under uncertainty 325 the problem is magnified by the sensitivity of prob abilistic relations to surrounding context [23) .
To illustrate the modularity problems that arise in probabilistic knowledge representations, we ad duce an example from Cooper's NESTOR [10] that was used by Spiegelhalter [48] for another· purpose. NESTOR's domain is hypercalcemia, hence the pro gram includes a knowledge base relating a patient's calcium level to other physiological states and asso ciated findings. In Spiegelhalter's model fragment, the unconditional or prior probability of coma is .05. To us non-specialists this value seems high; a much lower fraction of people we know are comatose. Of course, the number may be valid for the population treated by the program: patients identified somehow for a hypercalcemia work-up.
The point is that the knowledge base contains no definition for the population it is applicable to. Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones [49] discuss the issue of transportability of statistical knowledge bases, con cluding that it remains a serious problem. A greater difficulty, in our view, is the limitation it imposes on the scope of any such knowledge base. Suppose we wished to extend NESTOR's domain by includ ing medical knowledge from another program work ing in a neighboring or overlapping clinical area. Patil's ABEL [35] , for example, models disorders of electrolytes other than calcium, and considers more deeply the acid/base issues relevant to hypercal cemia. In broadening the domain, we have no idea which parts of the hypercalcemia model remain valid and which must be changed in light of the modifi ed population and new interacting variables. Although the same is strictly true of ABEL's knowledge-we cannot be certain that the electrolyte model is still correct when calcium is considered explicitly-the causal link structure of ABEL is more robust than the precise statistical relationships.
The robustness of causal links rests partly in their imprecision (weaker statements hold in more con texts and are therefore more modular), but also in that they capture a critical aspect of the domain knowledge. A causal model with a surface represen tation refl ecting a theory or set of organizing princi ples underlying the domain should be less sensitive to context than an arbitrary selection of observed relationships among variables.
Multiple Knowledge Sources
The majority of knowledge-based computer pro grams are modeled not on single human experts but on expertise gleaned from multiple sources. A versatile robot physician should (like its human coun terpart) include knowledge based on several human experts, as well as medical texts, journal articles, databases, and observed clinical results. Unfortunately, a knowledge engineer has no avail able standard for combining knowledge from these disparate sources into a single coherent belief model. In fact, even if each of the individual sources were stated in terms of consistent Bayesian decision mod els, there is no accepted normative procedure for de riving a Bayesian model from their combination [15) . Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that a purely calculus-based algorithm could be developed because an effective combination procedure would need to take into account the strengths and weak nesses of each knowledge source, as well as the nature of disagreements among the sources.
4
Decision Calculus as Object Language Some may still object that our separation of the sec ondary tasks from the primary decision is artifi cial. For example, the problem of the colleague present ing knowledge to the physician can be framed in decision-theoretic terms: select the fraction, level of abstraction, and presentation of the knowledge that would be of maximum utility to the physician. The oretically, it is possible to reformulate each task as a decision problem, here by treating communication acts as decision options. However, we find this solu tion unsatisfactory for two main reasons:
• Viewing these tasks as decision problems fails to take advantage of their special structure.
• The resulting decision problem overwhelms our practical model-building capabilities.
This latter point summarizes the lesson we draw from our analysis of knowledge engineering issues in Sec tion 3. An approach we have implicitly advocated else where in this paper takes the uncertainty calculus as part of an object language to be reasoned about by the decision-making computer program. Asser tions stated in terms of calculus elements (in partic ular, probabilities) are derived from the knowledge base, which need not encode facts directly in that form. To choose a plan of action, the program con structs a decision model founded on the formal calcu lus. Calculus-based representations may or may not play a role in structures employed to support rea-326 soning tasks surrounding the primary decision, for example, user models built to aid communication.
This position has been expressed by previous AI researchers. Even in pronouncing probability "epis temologically inadequate," McCarthy and Hayes ac knowledge that "the formalism will eventually have to allow statements about the probabilities of events" (emphasis added) [33, page 490). More recently, Grosof has provided a first-order-logic formulation treating probabilistic statements as terms within a meta-language [18, 19) .
In the remainder of this paper we develop this solution approach, taking the object language to be Bayesian decision theory. As suggested in Sec tion 2.1, once the calculus is restricted to this role the case for decision-theoretic semantics becomes com pelling. Motivations for introducing variant calculi are reduced because secondary tasks and knowledge engineering issues are addressed by extra-calculitic mechanisms. In this context, general arguments for probability [6, 24) as well as specific criticisms of alternate calculi (MYCIN certainty factors [22) and fuzzy probability [7, 14) , for example) are difficult to refute.
5
Incomplete Decision Models
A direct implementation of the decision-calculus-as object-language approach may be feasible-if we re lax the strict requirement that decision models be complete in the Bayesian sense of full specification of probabilities and utilities.4 Indeed, many uncer tainty mechanisms offered in the literature highlight incompleteness as a feature: D-S belief functions [41), Cooper's NESTOR [10) , and Good's lower probabili ties [16) , to name but a few. While incompleteness is not a panacea, we will see that allowing partial mod els may offer substantial advantages with respect to each of the reasoning tasks and knowledge engineer ing issues described above.
Incompleteness and Evidential
Structure
One of the most-cited virtues of uncertainty calculi that admit incompleteness is that they allow the rep-4 "Completeness" as used here is only defined with respect to a particular space of designated events. A model complete for a coarse-grained event space may be incomplete for a more refined space or for one defined by overlapping propositions.
The incompleteness we are interested in permits the problem solver to refer to events for which probability distributions are unavailable. resentation to express ignorance about the proposi tions in question. Although in Section 5.2 we dis pute the claim that incompleteness straightforwardly captures ignorance, allowing decision models to be incomplete does facilitate the expression of eviden tial structure and model derivation (that is, source of beliefs )-necessary preludes to any representation of "ignorance." Ignorance aside, these are precisely the sorts of knowledge irrelevant for one-shot deci sions yet indispensable for the surrounding reasoning tasks.
That belief functions offer advantages in repre senting evidential structure is the keystone of the case for the Dempster-Shafer uncertainty calculus. In pleading the case, Shafer relates a model for ev idence acquisition as receiving a sequence of noisy messages asserting that the true state of nature lies in various hypothesis sets [43] . For some environ ments, this model appears to correspond well to ac tual information-gathering processes. In the applica tion of Lowrance et al. [32] , for example, information input is of the form "the ship location is in the set A." Other applications of the D-S calculus stretch the interpretation of Shafer's evidence model some what beyond its elasticity. Lemmer [31] argues that the use of statistically derived data is inconsistent with this formulation, thereby invalidating numer ous applications in the literature.
A belief function represents evidence structure by distinguishing knowledge based on a single piece of evidence supporting A= { a1, ... , an } from an equiv alent (in the Bayesian sense) belief state based on n weaker pieces of evidence supporting the individual ais. But arguments that this is a good representa tion for evidential structure must ultimately be set tled on empirical grounds, as Shafer points out [42, page 15] . Connections of evidence to sets of hypothe ses is only one component of evidential structure other features of evidence patterns not captured in the D-S belief function decomposition would surely be useful as well. For example, incompleteness aris ing from logical combinations of propositions in Nils son's probabilistic logic [34) might be viewed as a representation of the "boolean pattern" of evidence. There is no a priori reason to think that a single un certainty calculus-D-S belief functions or one yet to be invented-can provide a universally appropriate means for expressing evidential structure.
The issue of evidential structure representation can and should be divorced from degree-of-belief as pects of a calculus. Evidence structuring mecha nisms inspired by the D-S approach are generally im plementable within other formalisms. For example, 327 Pearl [36] was able to achieve many of the benefi ts of Gordon and Shortliffe's hierarchical D-S scheme [17] with a Bayesian mechanism.5 And other models of evidence may be better suited for a Bayesian treat ment than one based on belief functions.
Currently, there is little empirical support for the effectiveness of D-S or any other particular mecha nism for representing evidential structure. We also lack, for that matter, strong demonstrations of the benefits of evidence structure representation for un certain reasoning tasks. But despite the lamentable dearth of concrete experience, an examination of the tasks themselves suggests that evidence structure is one of the components of a good uncertainty repre sentation, and that incompleteness can play a sup porting role in capturing this structure.
5.2
Incompleteness, Reasoning Tasks, and Knowledge Engineering
A close look at the reasoning tasks and knowledge engineering issues discussed in Sections 2 and 3 re veais that many of the reasoning problems identified are aggravated substantially by the requirement of completeness for decision models. Some brief exam ples:
• Information Gathering. The prospect of receiv ing additional data, facts, and advice pertain ing to the decision problem entails major ex pansions to any complete Bayesian belief model. Although structural regularities such as condi tional independence conditions may be exploited to reduce the assessment task, construction of complete models for all but the most narrow de cision contexts is likely to be intractable.
• Communication. The common approaches to explanation exploit the structure of evidence leading the program to its conclusions. If the uncertainty representations that best capture evidential structure happen to be incomplete decision models, insisting on completeness de grades the program's explanatory ability.
• Model Construction. Model construction from a modular knowledge base is largely an assembly 5Pearl interprets the relation of evidence to a set of hy potheses S as an assertion of conditional independence be tween the evidence and subsets of S given S. Because his algorithm performs complete propagation based on this asser tion, the representation does not explicitly maintain incom pleteness and therefore cannot reconstruct the evidence pat tem. However, as Pearl notes, the propagation steps could be postponed with appropriate bookkeeping, thereby providing the desired evidence feature.
task: piecing together a decision model from dis tributed fragments. In this decentralized frame work, it is difficult to ensure that the result ing assembly is complete and consistent. A col lection of submodels, each complete in isolation may underspecify the situation in combination.
• Knowledge Modification Incomplete models pos sess a modularity advantage over complete mod els for the simple reason that weak statements hold in a wider variety of contexts than strong ones.
• ·Multiple Knowledge Sources. As noted above, when a knowledge base is derived from a group of experts or a combination of sources, there is no accepted normative procedure for integrat ing the opinions and judgments into a single Bayesian decision model [15) .
Two main points arise from our survey of incom pleteness and its relation to evidential structure, rea soning tasks, and knowledge engineering.
First, the benefits of permitting incompleteness in decision models are substantial across the board. Though these benefits are intangible (or at least diffi cult to quantify within the decision formalism itself) and subject to debate, they cannot be dismissed as negligible or irrelevant. In the sense that any model can only approximate reality [47), true completeness is an unattainable standard anyway. Those con cerned with indecisiveness resulting from incomplete models should be persuaded to examine the tradeoff more closely, as we shall in Section 6.
Second, the diversity of uses for incompleteness suggests that a calculus oriented toward a single form of incomplete model cannot be ideal. Instead, the calculus is better treated as a decision model object language with a variety of structural constructs for expressing the incompleteness. It is reasonable to expect that different representation schemes will be best suited to the various tasks.
A corollary to this second point is that simple in terpretations of the amount of incompleteness can not be correct. Without knowing the reason for the lack of full model specification (modularity consid erations, limited modeling resources, or other possi bilities suggested above), one cannot maintain that a measure of incompleteness expresses "ignorance" or any other particular quality. Ignorance and in completeness are two separate issues and should be strictly distinguished. Failure to do so is a prime source of common misconceptions about uncertainty calculi. 328 
6
Making Decisions from In complete Models
In allowing incompleteness we sacrifice guaranteed decisiveness in our decision models. Many ap proaches to decision making in underdetermined sit uations have been proposed over the years; we briefly review some of them in this section. Our intent is to provide a sense of the options available rather than to endorse a particular technique.
Complete the Model
One category of techniques comprises those that transform the incomplete model into a complete one by filling in the gaps. The method receiving the most theoretical and practical attention is to choose the complete probability model maximizing entropy among those consistent with the incomplete model provided [26] . Grosof [19] demonstrates that this and other "gap-filling" approaches are forms of non monotonic reasoning about statements in the uncer tainty calculus.
Heuristic Decision Rules
Methods within a second category generate decisions directly from incomplete models. Though lacking normative justification, these techniques can be com putational bargains. The prototypical decision rule for incomplete models is the minimax loss criterion studied in statistics [2] . Methods based on structural properties of the evidence and arguments salient to the decision, such as Cohen's endorsement theory [9] , are also examples of this category.
Further Computation and Assessment
The third approach is based on a premise that fur ther computation and/or assessment can eventually achieve decisiveness. To converge on a decision, com putation may be directed toward either refinement of the decision model or dominance-proving activ ities. Decision model refinement falls within the model construction task we discussed in Section 3.1. Dominance-proving involves computational manipu lations of the incomplete decision model aimed at defining the set of admissible strategies. Little research effort has been expended to date on architectures and languages for general-purpose decision proving, although numerous techniques ap plicable to special cases have been developed [13, 21, 51, 53] . The variety of dominance-proving strate gies available seems to indicate that several different forms of incompleteness must be accommodated; un doubtedly many of these will be unlike the kinds of incompleteness useful for capturing evidential struc ture.
Decision Making: Discussion
The far-from-exhaustive review above suggests that a variety of remedies are available for indecisiveness in duced by incompleteness in decision models. All are oriented towards quantitative incompleteness; miss ing strategies, events, or other structural model fea tu:t:es are not addressed.
In addition, each of the methods has its own limi tations pertaining to the forms of incomplete models they accommodate and the reasons for incomplete ness on which they are justified. Comparisons among them must be performed on empirical grounds, or theoretically within a specific framework for incom pleteness. The best decision-making policy for any practical program probably consists of a mixture of the above and other approaches. Assessment of the costs and benefits of each method for the types of incomplete models they are to be applied to should be used to determine which method or combination is most appropriate for the particular task at hand.
Conclusion
Our observations over the preceding sections lead us to a series of methodological conclusions for the de velopment of uncertain reasoning mechanisms.
1. Uncertainty representations sufficient for one shot decision-making may be inadequate for the larger reasoning problem that encompasses sup porting tasks such as information-gathering and communication.
2. The variety of knowledge engineering concerns makes it unlikely that incremental extensions to an existing calculus will offer benefi ts for a sig nifi cant fraction of them.
3. Approaches that reason about the elements of a calculus place the burden of supporting the various reasoning tasks on extra-calculitic mechanisms. Once the responsibility is thus transferred, the case for a calculus derived from Bayesian decision theory is considerably strengthened.
4. Numerous engineering objectives are served by permitting incomplete decision models in the 329 underlying representation. However, this mul tiplicity of objectives also requires that many forms and interpretations of incompleteness be accommodated. Again, no "calculus" will suf fice.
5. Although the possibility of indecisiveness is an unavoidable by-product of incompleteness, many computational courses are open to pro grams faced with such situations. Further re search in this area appears promising.
In this essay, we have tried to unify a growing body of research that implicitly or explicitly treats the de cision calculus as an object language manipulated by higher-order mechanisms for uncertain reasoning. Those who would invent calculi to directly address some of the knowledge engineering issues are asking too much from such a limited class of representation mechanisms. A more reasonable role for uncertainty calculi in knowledge-based computer programs is to provide a grounding in decision theory, thereby offer ing a semblance of normative status to the decisions made by these programs.
